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Jan 01 0001
China-Pakistan Nuclear Relations after the Cold War and Its International Implications
By ZHANG Jiegen
Though China-Pakistan relations have been viewed by both countries as ‘all-weather, time-tested’ strategic cooperative partner all along, there are comparatively few studies relating to this bilateral relations in the Chinese community of international studies. Considering the extraordinary importance of Pakistan in the integral structure of China’s foreign relations, this kind of phenomenon in China’s academic circle is quite abnormal. The year 2011 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan. There are a series of papers relating to China-Pakistan relations published for celebration. However, these papers are mainly macro-level studies and focused on the strategic aspects of the bilateral relations, lacking in in-depth studies on detailed aspects and specific issues in China-Pakistan relations.
In retrospect of China-Pakistan relations in the past sixty years, it is not difficult to conclude that security relations is the most important aspect in the bilateral relations, which can be viewed as the key pillar of the whole China-Pakistan relations. Generally speaking, China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation is an unavoidable subject when it comes to talks about security relations between them. Nevertheless, due to the sensitivity of this topic in China, very few scholars have been doing some research relating to China-Pakistan nuclear relations by far. Consequently, there is a serious lack of special research on this important issue from Chinese perspective. Unfortunately for China, with the constant development of Chin-Pakistan nuclear relations, overseas media often exaggerates the facts and suspects the real intention of China following each step of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. At the same time, quite a few scholars from India and Western countries have published many papers and articles in academic journals or newspapers. However, being subject to the discriminatory standpoints, the media and academic circles from India and the Western countries often misunderstand the China-Pakistan nuclear relations. Moreover, some scholars even criticize the ordinary nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan intentionally. This paper aims at arguing against these misperceptions. To do so, it starts with the review of the history of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation and then tries to study the main factors influencing China-Pakistan nuclear relations objectively. After that, the paper probes into the future of China-Pakistan relations and puts forward the author’s thinking about its international implications.

I. The External Perspectives on China-Pakistan Nuclear Relations

Both the structure of the international system and the geopolitical situation of South Asia have changed greatly after the Cold War, but the traditional friendly security relation between China and Pakistan still preserves its original status. Undoubtedly, the friendly cooperation on nuclear issue plays a pivotal role in the process of boosting mutual confidence and stabilizing strategic cooperation between China and Pakistan. To China and Pakistan, as far as the nuclear cooperation is concerned, it not only results from given history background, but also is rooted in the objective review of each other’s strategic interests by the two countries. Ignoring the history background and being short of understanding the strategic needs of China and Pakistan, scholars from India and Western countries often evaluate China-Pakistan nuclear relations from external factors or still understand this relationship with the Cold-War mentality. As a result, it’s inevitable for them to misunderstand the friendly cooperation between China and Pakistan in the nuclear field with the discriminatory vision.

The first and most popular argument about China-Pakistan relations is to understand the nuclear ties between them from the traditional realistic point of view. “Balance of power” is the core concept for these scholars to analyze it. T.V. Paul, James McGill Professor from McGill University of Canada, is a typical supporter for this argument. In his words, “China has continued to interpret its nonproliferation commitments narrowly with regard to supplying nuclear and missile-related materials to its key allies in the developing world, especially Pakistan”. He argues that “Beijing’s motivations in transferring materials and technology to Pakistan derive largely from Chinese concerns about the regional balance of power and are part of a Chinese effort to pursue a strategy of containment in its enduring rivalry with India”. He adds that “if acute conflict and an intense arms race between India and Pakistan persist, India would continue to be bracketed with its smaller regional rival Pakistan and not with China”.[1] His viewpoint seems logical and often is cited by some other analysts working on China’s non-proliferation policy. However, he overlooked two key important facts which have been going along from the end of the Cold War till now. One is that China has made great progress in participating in international non-proliferation regime. Another fact is that Sino-Indian relations have continued to be reconciled and improved in the post-Cold War era.

The second misperception on China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation is to overstate the nuclear cooperative depth between China and Pakistan, which views the nuclear relation between China and Pakistan as ‘nuclear alliance’. In a paper titled “China-Pakistan Nuclear Alliance”, Siddharth Ramana, a research officer from the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies based in India, points out that there exits a security alliance between China and Pakistan. He says that “this alliance was to take the form of nuclear cooperation, especially in the aftermath of the Indian nuclear test of 1974”. In his perspective, China makes use of this alliance to “achieve twin strategic objectives of encirclement of India, and a proliferation buffer, wherein Pakistan in turn further proliferate Chinese nuclear technology, giving China leeway in investigations”. He argues that China does not extend its nuclear umbrella to Pakistan but uses Pakistan as an “extended deterrence proxy” towards India.[2] This perception exaggerates China’s strategic objectives on the one hand, and on the other, neglects not only the equal essence of the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation but also Pakistan’s strategic independence in the nuclear area.

A more discriminatory argument comes from Ashley J. Tellis, a Washington D.C.-based influential scholar. As a steadfast supporter of U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, he employed a totally different criterion to criticize China-Pakistan civil nuclear cooperation. From his view, the differences between the two are significant because “unlike the U.S.-India civilian nuclear initiative, whose terms were publicly debated, the Sino-Pakistani agreement is a secret covenant, secretly concluded” and “whereas the United States respected the international nonproliferation regime by requesting a special NSG waiver to permit nuclear trade with India, China seeks to short-circuit the NSG rather than appeal to its judgment”. So he argues that “it’s time for the United States to raise its voice” to “convey to China its strong concern about the planned reactor sale to Pakistan”.[3] From the Chinese perspective, his arguments not only exhibit a hegemonic logic but also show the western intention to infringe on the independent right to develop relations with its strategic partner.

Contrasting with the three arguments mentioned above, the view of Mark Hibbs looks much softer. He mainly argues that China’s nuclear deal with Pakistan reflects “the growing confidence and assertiveness of China’s nuclear energy program”. In his opinion, “China’s increasingly ambitious nuclear energy program is becoming more autonomous” and “China will likely become the world’s second-biggest nuclear power generator after the United States by 2020”. In this context, he concludes that China’s nuclear export to Pakistan is a part of China’s nuclear export strategy and the political function of the nuclear trade between China and Pakistan can’t be exaggerated. [4] To some extent, I partly agree with him. But I argue that the whole China-Pakistan nuclear relations should be considered comprehensively.

II. A Brief Historical Review of China-Pakistan Nuclear Relations

One important reason that some foreign scholars misread the China-Pakistan nuclear relations is that they do not take into account the historical background of the development of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, and therefore, with the time going on, do not see the actual changes of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. In this case, it is not difficult to understand that as mentioned earlier, some scholars believe that China has been engaged in nuclear proliferation in South Asia even today. Frankly speaking, this phenomenon is related to the opaque nuclear cooperation conducted by China and Pakistan. However, this ambiguity just mainly existed in the era of the Cold War. In this special historical context, it is unfair to evaluate China-Pakistan nuclear relations of that period with today’s nuclear non-proliferation requirements when it comes to such sensitive areas as nuclear cooperation. After the Cold War, it is extremely unscientific to look at the China-Pakistan nuclear relations at post-Cold War era, especially in the new century with the China-Pakistan cooperation model in the Cold War. Overall, divided by the two historic events, the end of the Cold War and South Asia Nuclear Test, the development of China-Pakistan nuclear relationship has gone through three historical periods.

The first period is from the mid-1970s to the end of the Cold War. As early as in 1950, Pakistan formally recognized the People's Republic of China, being the first third-world country in the world and also the first Islamic country to establish formal diplomatic relations with China. However, a close political relationship between China and Pakistan began only after the Sino-Indian War in 1962; it is a premise for the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation later on. Pakistan's nuclear program started much later than that of India. Indeed, it can be traced back to the early 1970s. Fundamentally speaking, Pakistan develops its nuclear program to safeguard its own security, as its conventional military power is weaker than India and India has been secretly developing nuclear weapons. Seeking cooperation with the outside power is an important way to develop its nuclear weapons. Due to the increasingly close China-Pakistan political relations, Pakistan opens the door of the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation at the beginning of its nuclear program, and China is also willing to carry out cooperation with Pakistan in the nuclear area. It is obviously inconsistent with historical facts that western scholars tend to ignore Pakistan’s inherent drive to seek nuclear cooperation with China, while blaming China for engaging in nuclear proliferation in South Asia through nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. It is a difficult thing to confirm the specific starting point of nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan, but the last will and testament of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reveals that the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation began in 1976 and he has made 11 years of efforts to work it out prior to this.[5] The conversation between Bhutto and Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. Secretary of State, reveals that during this period, China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation was mainly focused on the nuclear reprocessing technology, instead of uranium enrichment technology.[6] What pushed further nuclear relationship between China and Pakistan was an official China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation agreement signed in 1986; it was the agreement that forms the close relationship of nuclear technology transfer between China and Pakistan.[7] China and Pakistan has never officially made this agreement public and disclose the specific transfer content of the nuclear technology. Western scholars draw the conclusion that China helped Pakistan develop nuclear weapons during this period mainly based on the information from intelligence agencies of the United States as well as the media report, which might be suspected and exaggerated.

The end of the Cold War witnessed the beginning of the second historical period of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. Compared to the Cold War era, the external environment faced by the China-Pakistani nuclear relationship has changed a lot. There are two major changes: First, along with the accelerated process of world arms control and nuclear disarmament, China has gradually integrated into the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which results in more and more constraints on its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan; Second, the United States has taken more stringent measures on arms control, and has imposed a series of sanctions on Pakistan and China because of the nuclear-related sensitive products transfer between them. Before an open nuclear test by Pakistan in 1998, the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan had been questioned by the western countries, whose intelligence was mainly from the United States. Such accusations included not only transferring the complete nuclear device design model, developing its uranium enrichment program and nuclear weapons-related materials, such as ring magnets, but also gradually focused on criticizing China transferred missiles technology to Pakistan. China formally joined the NPT in 1992, followed by joining the IAEA a year later; therefore, the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan has been increasingly under international supervision. China increasingly focuses on its international responsibilities and obligations when developing the traditional friendly nuclear relationship with Pakistan. Therefore, despite the skepticism of the China-Pakistan nuclear relationship, the U.S. government only mentioned in public that China has been helping Pakistan develop nuclear weapons before 1992.[8]

The third historical period of the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation starts from South Asian open nuclear test in 1998. The nuclear tests in South Asia marked the open nuclear weaponization for India and Pakistan. Despite the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, only the countries with an open nuclear test before 1967 can be called nuclear weapon states, the fact can not be denied that India and Pakistan have became the two de facto nuclear weapon countries. By then, China-Pakistani nuclear relations had evolved into a relations between a nuclear state recognized by the international nuclear regime and a de facto nuclear state drifting away from the international nuclear regime. After the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan, the international community led by the U.S., implemented nuclear embargo. It encountered difficulties in developing nuclear relationship with the two countries, by the rules or in practice. In addition, China joined the NSG in 2004, which further compressed the space of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. Therefore, the China-Pakistan nuclear relationship was inevitably be affected, because this impact was caused by external factors, the nature of the China-Pakistan friendship and cooperation in the nuclear field was not interrupted. On the contrary, with the tremendous progress of Pakistan's nuclear technology and the rapid development of civilian nuclear technology in China, there was a broader space in the field of civilian nuclear energy cooperation between the two countries. In this context, the two countries significantly speeded up civilian nuclear energy cooperation in recent years. In 2005, China began to provide Pakistan with a second nuclear power station, 14 years after the first. Since 2010, China has agreed to continue to construct another two 650 MW nuclear power reactors in Chashma, a place in central Pakistan’s Punjab province, and decided to supply the fifth nuclear reactor to Pakistan. At this point, the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan had been no longer in the area of security mainly, but in energy and commercial fields, which was fully under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although still questioned by the West and India, the cooperation process is now irreversible, and will play a positive role in promoting China-Pakistan relations in the new era.

III. The Main Factors Affecting the Development of China-Pakistan Nuclear Relations

China-Pakistan nuclear relationship is an important part of the overall China-Pakistan relations. The perceptions of its importance relating to their respective diplomatic strategy are critical. It is the internal and the most important factor to think about the development and trend of China-Pakistan nuclear relationship in the post-Cold War era. At the same time, every step of the progress of China-Pakistan nuclear relationship affects the nerves of countries in South Asia and related countries outside this region. The international community pays high attention to it, and therefore it can not be free from constraints of external factors.

First, the long-term nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan is the product of comprehensive and friendly China-Pakistan relations. As mentioned earlier, the cooperation between China and Pakistan on the nuclear issue began in the mid-1970s, and it has been more than 40 years of history by now. During this period, though the international situation has undergone dramatic changes and the international pressure from various sides has never stopped, the friendly relations of the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation has never been interrupted, and will continue to develop further more. To Pakistan, India is the first prevention object for its national security; however, because of the gap of its national power as well as conventional military power with India, it is a natural choice to develop strategic nuclear power to balance India with outside help. Among the major powers, the United States is certainly important for Pakistan, but the history of the development of US-Pakistan relationship indicates that the United States has never became Pakistan’s trusted ally, while China is completely different. The attitudes towards Pakistan's nuclear issue, which is a vital security interest for Pakistan, reflect the difference. The United States has generally been suppressing the nuclear program of Pakistan, and deregulation happens only when it needs Pakistan's cooperation on regional issues; China has always been respecting Pakistan's security concerns and support Pakistan in maximum with its own resources, within the extent permitted by international rules. As far as China is concerned, Pakistan has an important strategic position in its neighboring environment and diplomacy.[9] But in the relations between China and Pakistan, there have been problems of uneven structure, that is, economic cooperation, personnel exchanges and cultural exchange (‘low politics’), and the political and military cooperation (‘high politics’) has a big gap between the two countries.[10] Because the serious structural imbalance problem exists, it is especially important for long-term friendship cooperation of key areas such as nuclear issue to maintain "all weather" cooperative relationship between the two countries.

Second, South Asian geopolitical situation is the most direct factor that affects China-Pakistan nuclear relationship. Western scholars tend to interpret China-Pakistan relations in this perspective, putting geopolitical considerations as the dominant factor of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. While exaggerated, South Asian geopolitical factors really can not be ignored. In South Asia, a basic geopolitical fact is the enduring confrontation between India and Pakistan. After the open nuclear tests of South Asia in 1998, it has evolved into a nuclear confrontation between the two de facto nuclear-weapon states. Because both India and Pakistan are in the process of pursuing a credible nuclear deterrence, strategic stability in South Asia is facing severe challenges.[11] Correspondingly, another geopolitical reality that can not be ignored is the gradually reconciled India-Pakistan relations in recent years. The traditional view is that, as long as the Kashmir issue is not resolved between India and Pakistan, the hostility between the two countries will not come to an end. However, with the rise of India and its changing regional policy, as well as Pakistan's economic difficulties and its desire to change its undeveloped status to narrow the disparity in power with India, the motivation for cooperation is increasingly enhanced in terms of reconciling the hostile relations between the two countries in the security field and the development of cooperation in other areas. In addition, the terrorism situation is getting worse after the Cold War, the terrorists’ seeking to possess mass destruction weapons shadowed this region, which affects not only the China-Pakistan nuclear relationship, but the triangle nuclear relationship among China, India and Pakistan. In facing of the common enemy of terrorism, the non-state actors, China, India and Pakistan also need to find a breakthrough point for cooperation on the nuclear issue.

Third, the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and the trend of nuclear proliferation are important external factors affecting China-Pakistan nuclear relationship. Existing international nuclear non-proliferation regime is based on NPT. According to the NPT definition of the nuclear-weapon state, India and Pakistan, though tested their nuclear weapons openly in 1998, are clearly illegal. Therefore, to develop nuclear relations with these two countries is subject to the constraints of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the period of Cold War, because China did not participate in this regime, while the leading country of the regime, the United States, implemented double standards of the nuclear non-proliferation policy with obvious benefit-oriented policy, China and Pakistan nuclear relations has not been severely constrained by international nuclear non-proliferation regime because of Pakistan’s importance to the United States during that time and the large triangle relationship among China, the United States and the Soviet Union. But after the Cold War, with China's accelerated process of integration into the international nuclear non-proliferation, joining the NPT, CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty), China’s transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan is necessarily under the comprehensive protection of International Atomic Energy Agency. At the same time, the incident of Abdul Qadeer Khan, "the father of nuclear bomb” of Pakistan, allegedly engaged in nuclear proliferation at the beginning of this century, made China-Pakistan nuclear relationship further constrained by the international non-proliferation regime. Since the end of the Cold War, the international non-proliferation regime is more and more accepted by international community, but the momentum of nuclear proliferation in Asia is not optimistic. So far, the countries with more serious nuclear proliferation problems are basically in the surrounding areas of China. This can not fail to affect the development of China's foreign nuclear relationship, including the nuclear cooperation with the friendly and long-term strategic partnership, Pakistan.

Finally, China-Pakistan nuclear relationship has obviously been affected by major power factors, mainly the United States and India. India factor obviously plays a more important role in the early stages of the development of China-Pakistan nuclear relationship. In addition to the obvious geopolitical factors, it is also closely related to India's nuclear weapons development program. India's nuclear weaponization resulted not only in the strategic imbalance in South Asia, but also in China-Indian confrontation in the nuclear area because the main objective of India’s nuclear development is China. The close China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation in the Cold War focused on security is closely related with this. However, with the deepening of the process of nuclear weaponization in India and Pakistan, especially after open nuclear tests of the two states, India’s impact is not as obvious as before in China-Pakistan nuclear relationship. Accordingly, the Unite State’s impact increased significantly in China-Pakistan nuclear relationship. On one hand, the strategic position of Pakistan declines in diplomatic strategy of the United States after the Cold War. On the other hand, the friction between China and the United States in the field of nuclear non-proliferation increased. Between 2000 and 2004, the United States imposed sanctions on Chinese companies up to 50 times in the name of preventing non-proliferation.[12] This nominal friction generated by the nuclear issue, in fact, reflects the United States’ contention of the right to speak as a hegemony with the rapid rise of emerging powers in the international system. Based on the psychology of such precautions, the United States stepped up the cooperation with India in the military field, especially in the nuclear field. In addition to the impact of the China-Pakistan nuclear relationship individually, cooperation between the United States and India becomes important motivation to strengthen nuclear relations between China and Pakistan. The evolution of US-India civil nuclear agreement and the United States positively helping India look for special NSG waiver to permit nuclear trade with India lead to the discrimination of international nuclear regime towards Pakistan. As a key friend of Pakistan, China can not fail to take into account Pakistan’s nuclear cooperation requirements.

IV. Conclusion: Prospect and International Implications

Summing up from the above analysis, although the China-Pakistan nuclear relationship has changed greatly in the post-Cold War era, comparing with that relations in the Cold War era, the suspicion about the persistent China-Pakistan relations has never stopped. Due to the overall configuration of China-Pakistan relations, the respective needs in terms of strategic security and commercial interests for China and Pakistan, and the geopolitical factor, China-Pakistan nuclear relations does not change its characteristics of friendly cooperation in essential. But with the evolution of international nonproliferation regime, China’s nonproliferation policy adjusting by itself, and the changing geopolitical configuration of South Asia, China-Pakistan nuclear relation should also keep up with the times. For China and Pakistan, to further the cooperative relations more closely in nuclear area, some kinds of policy adjustments are necessary and imperative on the premise of keeping the traditional friendly cooperation.

Firstly, both China and Pakistan should not avoid making response to the international pressure straightforward despite that the nuclear cooperation between them is not recognized legally by international nonproliferation regime. On the contrary, if they strive to integrate into the international nuclear cooperative regime positively in the long run, the China-Pakistan nuclear relations may gain wider space to develop in the future. It’s true for China and Pakistan to achieve this goal because of Pakistan’s proliferation record in the past and the limited diplomatic capability of China in the international nonproliferation field. However, China should also help Pakistan look for special NSG waiver to permit nuclear trade with it just as what the U.S. has done for India. Though the possibility of success on this achievement is very slim, the positive meaning of it can’t be denied because of two important reasons. One is that it can keep the mutual communication between China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation and international nuclear regime. Relating to this, another reason is that it can help the international community understand Pakistan’s need to get cooperation from outside and stop criticizing Pakistan blindly with complete bias.

Secondly, the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan itself also needs to be institutionalized. So far, the agreement for the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation still needs to be traced back to the Cold War era, namely 1986 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. But now the times of the nuclear cooperation background is changing greatly, the content of the agreement also need to be adjusted. At the same time, the form of agreement should not be in a secretive way, because opaque deal for the nuclear cooperation can only lead to more suspicion from the international community. Corresponding to the US-India nuclear deal, a clear and integral civilian nuclear cooperative agreement, in spite of the difficulty to be recognized by the international community, can reduce the international anxiety for China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation at least.

Thirdly, the goal orientation of the nuclear cooperation should also need to be adjusted. Different from the traditional way that both China and Pakistan pay too much attention to the strategic value, the bilateral nuclear cooperation now should emphasize on commercial value as much as its strategic value, and pay more attention to realize the business value in actual operation. Therefore, the focus of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation will inevitably be transferred from the traditional security domain to the commercial trade domain.

Looking into the future, as long as the orientation of bilateral nuclear relations between China and Pakistan is clearly made, the nuclear cooperation between them will advance irreversibly due to the traditional basis of friendly bilateral cooperation and the constant practical cooperation in specific areas. With China's overall integration into the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, China’s foreign nuclear cooperation will also be accepted by the international community more and more. At the same time, after Pakistan became the de facto nuclear country, its nonproliferation policy have continued to be changed in a meaningful way and its image of proliferation will also slowly change for better. Therefore, the external environment for China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation will be improved. The benign interaction between China Pakistan nuclear relations and international nonproliferation regime will not only be in favor of enhancing the bilateral nuclear relations, but also produce an active and far-reaching influence on the integral nuclear relations of the whole Asian region.

Source of documents:Global Review

more details:

[1] T. V. Paul, “Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer, 2003.
[2] Siddharth Ramana, “China-Pakistan Nuclear Alliance: An Analysis,” IPCS Special Report, Vol. 109, August 2011.
[3] Ashley J. Tellis, “The China-Pakistan Nuclear ‘Deal’: Separating Fact from Fiction,”
[4] See Mark Hibbs, “Pakistan Deal Signals China's Growing Nuclear Assertiveness,”
[5] Yogesh Kumar Gupta, “Common Nuclear Doctrine for India Pakistan and China,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 20 June 2004, doctrine-for-india-pakistan-and-china-1413.html.
[6] William Burr, “The China-Pakistan Nuclear Connection Revealed,” The National Security Archive, November 18, 2009, nuclear-connection-revealed/.
[7] See Siddharth Ramana, “China-Pakistan Nuclear Alliance: An Analysis,” IPCS Special Report, Vol. 109, August 2011.
[8] Archived material, “China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan,” archive/country_india/china/npakpos.htm.
[9] See ZHANG Guihong, “Pakistan’s Strategic Position and the Future of Sino-Pakistan Relations,” South Asian Studies Quarterly, No. 2, 2011.
[10] YE Hailin, “The Problems of Structure Imbalance and its Implications on China-Pakistan Relations in the New Era,” Contemporary Asia Pacific, No. 10, 2006.
[11] Relating to the instability of South Asian nuclear stability, see S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous deterrent: nuclear weapons proliferation and conflict in South Asia, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007.
[12] Daniel A. Pinkston, “Testimony before: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s Proliferation Practices and Its Role in the North Korea Nuclear Crisis,” US Congress, March 10, 2005, testimonies/05_03_10wrtr/pinkston_daniel_wrts.php.