

ABSTRACTS

Grand Strategy, General Environment, and Great Power Relations— Chinese Diplomacy at Seventy: Review and Outlook (Part One)

SIIS Study Group

ABSTRACT: Beginning in January 2019, the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies—where this journal is published—has convened ten seminars marking the seventieth anniversary of PRC’s founding and its diplomacy. Following each seminar a concluding report is released dealing with a certain subject in China’s diplomacy, such as theory, practice, context, strategy, neighborhood, and so on. In this first report, foreign policy experts conduct a survey of China’s strategic environment and the characteristics of great power diplomacy. It argues that in an era of great transformation and transition, China’s diplomacy vis-à-vis other great powers has to conform to the grand trends of the times and take full advantage of strategic opportunities. Either with America, Japan, Russia, or Europe, only an cooperative posture and positive-sum mentality can generate productive relationships and help maintain world stability. For an emerging modern power moving closer to the center of the world stage, multilateralism-oriented great power cooperation in rules-based global governance will lay the foundations for a better world featuring peace, prosperity, and progress.

KEYWORDS: China’s diplomacy, international environment, doctrine, great power relations, transition

On Strategic Stability in Cyberspace

ZHOU Hongren

ABSTRACT: Building a sustainable cyber order compatible with the current international order is the biggest challenge facing international society as the

strategic importance of cyber security increases. Maintaining strategic stability is of utmost importance as consensus among great powers over acceptable cyber behavior rarely exist. International cyber governance and cyber strategic stability maintenance have become two of the emerging scientific fields in international studies. Cyberspace is either stable, delicately stable, or unstable, the three states of strategic stability. Cyber stability is better studied from a cyclic perspective with the aim of designing robust institutions against instability. International norms, rules, and regulations are essential standards for cyber conduct. Frameworks of human knowledge and scientific theories are also helpful with respect to academic research on cyber strategic stability. An international order conducive to cyber strategic stability can only be built after effective dialogues and joint studies based on shared interests which shape individual countries' cyber strategies.

KEYWORDS: cyberspace, strategic stability, international governance, international order, cyber norms

Rule-making for Cyberspace: Consensus and Discord

LONG Kun and ZHU Qichao

ABSTRACT: Due to problems like cyber hegemony, ideological division, and platform fragmentation, the process of formulating international rules for cyberspace has been halted. Tallinn Manual compiled by NATO and the International Code of Conduct for Information Security jointly proposed by China, Russia, and some Central Asian countries, are currently the most influential documents in the field of international cyber rules. Tallinn Manual generally reflects the attitudes of the Western countries toward cyberspace while the ICCIS largely represents the perspectives of developing countries. This essay examines the old and new versions of these two important documents, and analyzes the major consensus and differences in the field of international rule-making for cyberspace. In order to increase its influence in the field of international rule-making for cyberspace, China needs to put more emphasis on

shaping the international cyberspace rules by means of soft law, explore the possibility of coordinating with Western countries in bridging major differences, and facilitate people-to-people exchanges with respect to cyber rule-making.

KEYWORDS: cyberspace, international norms, Tallinn Manual, International Code of Conduct for Information Security

Globalization of Science and Technology: China's Choice and Response

FENG Zhaokui

ABSTRACT: Science knows no national boundaries. Since the inception and growth of academic journals beginning in the 1770s, research findings by scientists from various countries have been disseminated in the form of academic papers in a vast range of publications, facilitating academic exchanges and cooperation among countries. As one of the most revolutionary human inventions, the Internet has further broken down the geographic barriers impeding the spread of science on a worldwide scale. However, technology is confined within national borders and influenced by national interests. The spread of core technology has a huge impact on national political, security, and strategic interests, and transnational transfer of technology is often the object of international competition. As common challenges facing humanity have become increasingly acute, the need for deeper international technology cooperation and exchange are more urgent than ever before. The tide of technology globalization is breaking down various national barriers. Historically technology embargo has been an instrument for Western countries to limit the transfer of advanced technology to the third world especially those deemed hostile to Western interests, from the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls to its successor the Wassenaar Arrangement, and from the Anglo-American Technical Cooperation Program to the Five Eyes Alliance. These exclusive Western blocs have been the biggest impediments to the globalization of technology. Recently, targeting Huawei in an asymmetric technology war in which a superpower is

trying to strangle a privately-owned Chinese company, the Trump administration is intensifying the effort to curb China's technology development. Amid the unstoppable tide of technology globalization, Huawei will outlast the current U.S. presidency, and the growth of China's high-tech industry will depend on Chinese wisdom and appropriate policies.

KEYWORDS: science, technology, globalization, de-globalization

U.S. Technology Strategy toward China: Development, Impact, and Countermeasures

SUN Haiyong

ABSTRACT: The Trump administration has significantly changed U.S. technology strategy toward China in line with the development of China's national capacity and U.S. domestic politics. This change is based on the perception that China's technological industry and its innovation policy will generate negative externalities detrimental to U.S. interests with respect to security, international order, and economy. On the whole, there is a consensus in the U.S. political circle on the negative impact of China's high-tech industry growth. The predominant perception among strategists is similar to that of the political circle, while the business community pays more attention to China's policy trend and the impact of the U.S. government's China policy on its business interests. The development of the Trump administration's technology strategy toward China, which is manifested in the current security, economic, trade, investment, and foreign policies, highlights a "whole-of-government" approach. The strategy has been on full display in the U.S. government's crackdown on Chinese high-tech companies. The Trump administration's technology strategy will undermine the stable foundation of Sino-U.S. political and security relations, bilateral cooperation in the global industrial chain, and global technology governance. In this context, China should deepen reform and build a more attractive business environment. At the same time, China needs to alleviate Sino-U.S. strategic competition and strengthen bilateral communication and coordination. In addition, China needs to

expand Sino-U.S. cooperation in the technology industry and global technology governance.

KEYWORDS: U.S. China policy, Sino-U.S. technology relations, science and technology policy

Reconfiguring the China-U.S. Relationship in a New Era

XIA Liping and DONG Shanshan

ABSTRACT: Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1979, China-U.S. relations have come to a crossroads for the third time. The Trump administration has abandoned the policy of "engagement" with China adopted by successive U.S. administrations after the end of the Cold War and turned to "strategic competition" with China, but has not ruled out selective cooperation with China. "Selective cooperation in the context of strategic competition between China and the United States" has become the new normal in China-U.S. relations. And the relationship of competition and cooperation between the two countries will last for a long time. The Trump administration's policies will lead to a partial decoupling of China-U.S. relations in high-tech cooperation, military-to-military exchanges, and academic and student exchanges. The main reasons for the new stage of China-U.S. relations include the structural contradictions in the international system, the negative impact of economic globalization, and the huge differences between the strategic cultures of China and the United States. The main areas of strategic competition between China and the United States include: the economic and trade frictions between the two sides will be prolonged; the competition and cooperation in the security field will be normalized; tensions over the Taiwan issue may intensify; and the disputes on human rights issues will have a negative impact on the bilateral relationship. However, the three pillars of China-U.S. relations determine that the two countries will not fall into the new Cold War, nor will they completely decouple from each other. In a new era, China-U.S. relations are facing a process of reconfiguration, which requires steady progress and the eventual realization of

China-U.S. relations based on coordination, cooperation, and stability.

KEYWORDS: new era, China-U.S. relations, trade dispute, Trump administration

The Trump Shock to the Anglo-American Special Relationship

XU Ruike

ABSTRACT: There have been three key factors contributing to the long-lasting Anglo-American special relationship, which are as follows: the strong sense of common identity, the long-term reciprocal cooperation, and the highly institutionalized security cooperation mechanisms. The strong sense of common identity facilitates America and Britain's recognition of common interests and common threat, and also helps consolidate strategic trust. The long-term reciprocal cooperation promotes both sides' appreciation of the other's strategic values and thereby contributes to their solidarity. The highly institutionalized security cooperation mechanisms facilitate the formation of good habits of cooperation within the US-UK security relationship and solidify interdependence between the two countries. Given recurrent collisions between the "Global Britain" concept and the Trumpism and Trump's controversial immigration policies, the Anglo-American common identity has been damaged. There have been more conflicting interests between the May government and the Trump administration in areas of global governance. Combined with the UK's diminishing strategic values to the United States in the post-Brexit era, the Anglo-American reciprocal cooperative relationship has thus been weakened to some degree. Nevertheless, the highly institutionalized Anglo-American intelligence, nuclear, and military relationships have remained as intimate as before, thereby helping maintain the Anglo-American special relationship. China should be clearly aware of the fact that the Anglo-American special relationship will continue to exert constraints on the UK's China policy, making it difficult for China and the UK to broaden and deepen their security cooperation.

KEYWORDS: Trump doctrine, Global Britain, Brexit, Anglo-American security cooperation

Economic and Trade Relations between the Pacific Alliance and China: Review and Prospects

HUANG Fangfang

ABSTRACT: Since its inception the Pacific Alliance has conducted extensive commercial and cultural exchanges with China, which has promoted the rapid development of bilateral trade relations and injected new impetus into regional integration and cross-regional cooperation. There are three main reasons for the rapid development of trade relations between the Pacific Alliance and China: first, the convergence of strategic interests provides good policy support for economic cooperation; second, economic complementarities provide the material basis; third, development-oriented cooperation serves as a value basis. There are still some problems in the economic relationship between the Pacific Alliance and China, such as the trajectory of the integration of the Pacific Alliance itself, the imbalance in the economic and trade relations between the Pacific Alliance and China, and the negative influence of third-party factors such as the United States. For China, to further promote the sustained and stable development of its economic and trade relations with the Pacific Alliance, efforts should be made in at least three aspects: first, to keep on supporting the integration of the Pacific Alliance and actively participate in its integration process; second, to explore new areas of development in economic and trade cooperation with the Pacific Alliance and gradually change the trade imbalances; third, to increase personnel training and cultural exchanges, especially strengthen economic and trade cooperation in the field of cultural industry.

KEYWORDS: Pacific Alliance, regional integration, development of economic and trade relations